> The worse impact is that you have access to all the deploy keys, and on builds.sr.ht, there are deploy keys for sr.ht itself (probably not the case with other instances).

This is the most unexpected bit.

Circumstances made it so I got a new computer right around the time srht put out their anti-LLM policy. So I immediately started setting up a forgejo instance on my home network. With the latest waves of attacks on he AUR, I decided to keep that machine completely free from all AUR packages or helpers. So I also set up a package registry through the forgejo instance. With some work I have a workflow that takes a PKGBUILD and publishes an arch package that I can just `pacman - Syu` to install. Obviously I only put my own pkgbuilds and the few I have manually vetted there.

Even after manual vetting I wanted to lock things down as much as possible on the CI. So. I went with rootless podman, and some patching of arch's build infra just to get it to be able to run `pkgctl build`.

One of the main thing I looked out for was making sure no credentials were available anywhere during the jobs where the pkgbuilds (which can contain arbitrary commands) are being executed. I'm sure srht has to consider many more scenarios than I do. That will definitely make it harder to wall off credentials access. But it is still surprising that deploy keys are left laying around.

BTW this is not an attack on srht. I stopped actively using it because of their new policy. I still have a paid subscription that I do not plan to cancel anytime soon. I still have my public projects where I don't use LLMs there. I think opinionated maintainers and projects (Linus/linux, Poettering/systemd and Drew come to mind) are a net good for open source. Opinionated people make better software because they care imo. And those opinions don't have to be restricted to purely technical matters.

But anyway, it's a small team and there is a lot to cover, but they should get those leaking keys under control as much as possible.

> So if you happen to be able to make ␛]8;;https://example.com/"/...␇ appear in the job logs —4 which you can, either without even having an account, by sending a patch to a public mailing list with continuous integration turned on

The fact that this could be triggered so easily — just sending a malicious patch to a mailing list — is pretty insane.

Really commendable work fixing up the upstream python project. I don't think there's anything to be embarrassed about in the timeline.

Build logs are such a tricky attack surface; sanitizing arbitrary build output is practically impossible without breaking useful formatting. Always assume untrusted input.

Oh my God, it's OSC 8 again. Because copy-pasting an URI from the terminal window is so 2003, and goodness gracious, having to look at an actual URL instead of an arbitrarily inaccurate description of it? That's, like, 1993. When I wrote my variant of ansi2html, I aggressively stripped out every C0 and C1, and all of the possible APC/DCS/OSC/PM sequences.

Meanwhile, internal links between different parts of a man page still don't exist (unless you use GNU Info but seriously, I'd rather use lynx on a folder of HTML files instead).

haven’t been properly rickrolled in years, wasn’t expecting that!

Congrats on the write up, seems extremely serious, I hope Sourcehut and Drew paid you well for this.

nitpick: typo "Vulnerabile" :)

I love sourcehut, and I can't really think anything to replace it. But here's my shot. It's a popular myth that independently from the project size, someone should always take the main stream product in the field than small projects because most of the people would use the main stream product and there's an higher chance that vulnerabilities get already exploited/recognized/fixed. Is that true or not? TL;DR: in the evaluation of such products (sourcehut but even self hosted stuff), should we also take account about the project history and the exposition to threats?

HN hug of death, strikes again.

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